NATO concluded a two-day summit in Chicago on May 21. Srdja Trifkovic, at Chronicles Magazine, distills the “impressively vacuous waffle” issuing from these publicly financed officials. This particular self-important convention, concludes Srdja, could have been avoided. A “day-long teleconference—preceded by a few thousand e-mails among a few dozen civil servants—at zero cost to U.S. taxpayers and zero inconvenience to the citizens of Chicago” would have done the job.
I’d go one better: There is no need for NATO. The sooner the US disinvests from NATO, the better off will “The American Interest” be served.
Alas, there is more at stake than the good of the people allegedly represented by NATO “leaders.” Thus, as Srdja points out, “The alliance will continue to expand its capabilities in spite of economic austerity.”
All of the key decisions on Afghanistan are made by the Obama administration.
It cannot be otherwise. That war has always been an American operation, with some peripheral support from a number of NATO countries. …
…the future of Afghanistan belongs to the Taliban. For 11 years, survival was all the Taliban needed to accomplish in order to win. Once the American and other NATO troops leave, the ANSF will collapse, President Karzai will seek refuge in the Emirates, and Afghanistan will revert to her premodern ways. It does not matter: The country is irrelevant to the security of NATO members, and it should never have become a theater of NATO operations.
On the American cold-war hangover of kicking Russia despite its co-operation, Srdja observes the following:
When Obama addressed the summit on May 21, he publicly thanked Russia and her Central Asian neighbors “that continue to provide critical transit” into Afghanistan. Therefore, it is remarkable that a major irritant in U.S.-Russian relations—the prospect of NATO membership for Georgia—was revived at the summit: “we have agreed to enhance Georgia’s connectivity with the Alliance, including by further strengthening our political dialogue, practical cooperation, and interoperability,” the declaration says, and “we appreciate Georgia’s substantial contribution . . . to Euro-Atlantic security.”
This is nonsense. Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia in August 2008 was one of
the most destabilizing events of the last decade in the Euro-Atlantic region. Imagine the reaction in Washington if Russia were to offer a military alliance to Mexico, equipped and trained the Mexican army, and guaranteed the inviolability of the Rio Grande frontier. Any further expansion of NATO along Russia’s flanks would confirm Moscow’s suspicion that, after the end of the Cold War, the underlying raison d’être of the alliance remains enmity with Russia. …
…Russia’s security interests demand a friendly “near-abroad” along her extended frontiers. Having a hostile Georgia on her southern flank—ran by an arguably unstable Mikhael Saakashvili—is a problem. Accepting Georgia into NATO would be seen in Russia as a security challenge of the highest order. Moreover, it would be detrimental to U.S. interests because of the security guarantee contained in Article V of the NATO Charter—the cornerstone of the alliance—which theoretically obliges the United States to risk an all-out war in defense of Georgia’s sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Srdja’s analysis in Chronicles is always highly recommended. Subscribe to the magazine once the editors complete their lineup with The Paleolibertarian Column, WND’s longest-standing, exclusive (rightist) libertarian column, also on RT.